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THE BATTLE OVER COMBAT:  
A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE 
COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION TO 
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
MICHAEL KUTNER† 
INTRODUCTION 
The combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act is a preservation of sovereign immunity from liability 
for injuries resulting from the “combatant activities” of the 
United States military.1  The exception is designed to protect the 
undeniably compelling government interest of defending the 
nation from harm without the burden of liability for action 
necessary to achieve that goal.2  It addresses the concern that 
imposing tort liability on the military could lead to a chilling 
effect on decision-making that would cause hesitation to act in 
the interest of national defense.3  To that end, the exception has 
in recent years been applied by federal courts in such a way as to 
effect a policy of “elimination of tort from the battlefield” 
entirely.4  At first glance, this interpretation seems quite neatly 
tailored to reflect the exception’s goal.  After all, it can hardly be 
said that the federal government intended to waive its sovereign 
immunity with respect to battlefield injuries caused by the 
direction of force towards enemy combatants.  Viewing this 
interpretation in the context of the exception’s application,  
 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.B.A., 2008, Hofstra University. Special thanks to Professor Adam 
Zimmerman and Assistant Dean Jeffrey Walker for their invaluable guidance and 
support. 
1 See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra Part II.B.2–3; see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (“In short, the policy embodied by the combatant activities exception is simply 
the elimination of tort from the battlefield . . . .”). 
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however, reveals that it extends immunity to a far broader range 
of activities than those involving the use of force against the 
enemy. 
Promulgated by the District of Columbia Circuit’s 2009 
decision in Saleh v. Titan Corp.,5 the interpretation of the 
combatant activities exception as a tool to eliminate tort liability 
from the battlefield has led to a standard that runs contrary not 
only to Supreme Court precedent, but also to basic concepts of 
fairness.  In Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York applied this interpretation of the exception to a lawsuit 
brought by a private contractor employed by the United States 
government.6  The plaintiff was injured when he fell in a 
bathroom on a forward operating base that was negligently 
maintained by the defendant.7  The court applied the combatant 
activities exception and denied the plaintiff the chance to recover 
for his injuries.8  Essentially, the court believed that the 
maintenance of a bathroom was a combatant activity for the 
purpose of this exception because the bathroom was located on 
what it considered a battlefield.9 
That a lawsuit arising out of activity which is so far from the 
common understanding of combat could be preempted by the 
combatant activities exception simply because it occurred on a 
battlefield inexorably raises questions about what other types of 
actions would be similarly barred.  What, for example, of the 
claims brought by Jamie Leigh Jones, who in 2004 was brutally 
sexually assaulted in the “Green Zone” of Baghdad at an 
installation owned by Halliburton?10  Ms. Jones’s repeated 
complaints of sexual harassment and requests for the all-female 
housing that she claimed was promised in her contract were 
ignored by Halliburton before she was beaten and gang raped by 
several Halliburton employees in her barracks bedroom.11  Her 
claims could likewise be preempted by the combatant activities 
exception under this interpretation.  It does not make sense that 
Ms. Jones and other similarly injured women could be denied 
 
5 580 F.3d 1. 
6 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 710–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
7 Id. at 700. 
8 Id. at 715. 
9 Id. at 713–14. 
10 See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2009). 
11 Id. at 231. 
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relief by a statute designed to shield the government from 
liability resulting from military action simply because they were 
injured on or near a battlefield. 
Further equitable concerns surrounding this interpretation 
of the exception arise when considering the countless civilians 
whose hometowns and villages have become warzones.12  Under 
this approach, these civilians would be unable to bring civil 
actions for grossly negligent or even malicious conduct of 
American troops or private contractors simply because an 
impersonal foreign power determined that it was necessary to 
conduct combat operations steps away from their homes. 
A second interpretation of the exception exists that takes 
some of these equitable concerns into account.  The Ninth 
Circuit, in deciding Koohi v. United States,13 promulgated an 
interpretation of the combatant activities exception that is more 
narrowly tailored to accomplishing the statute’s goals.  
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit interprets the exception as 
applying only to activities that involve the direction of hostile 
force.14  In Koohi, for example, the tracking and engagement of a 
civilian aircraft mistaken for an enemy warplane was preempted 
by the exception.15  This is the type of activity, as opposed to 
bathroom maintenance, which one would logically assume would 
be preempted by the combatant activities exception in light of its 
wording and apparent intent.  It is unlikely that under this 
interpretation a suit for something like a slip and fall in a 
bathroom would be barred.  Under this interpretation, the 
application of the exception seems to turn on whether or not the 
activity involved actual combat, rather than the activity’s 
location relative to combat. 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not without flaws, however.  
Developed in the context of a conflict which is very different from 
those in which the United States is currently engaged,16 this 
interpretation is simultaneously too broad and too narrow.  It is 
too broad because unlike the conflict surrounding Koohi, current 
battlefields are often densely populated urban areas.17  Providing 
 
12 See Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew W. Lehren, Buffeted by Fury and Chaos, 
Civilians Paid Heaviest Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A1. 
13 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992). 
14 Id. at 1335. 
15 Id. at 1337. 
16 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
17 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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a broad shield from liability for the direction of hostile force 
becomes less reasonable as the risk that that hostile force will 
harm noncombatants increases.  At the same time, the approach 
is too narrow because it may open the government to liability for 
activities that do not involve the direction of hostile force but to 
which strong policy considerations nonetheless favor the 
extension of immunity. 
Under both circuits’ interpretations, the government may be 
shielded from liability for injuries resulting from activities that 
could have been more safely performed without compromising 
national defense.  This Note takes the position that in light of the 
inadequacies of both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ interpretations 
of the combatant activities exception, a new approach is needed 
that will strike an appropriate balance between the government’s 
interest in defending the nation unencumbered by the threat of 
tort liability and the rights of injured parties to recover. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and discusses the Supreme Court’s 
prevailing approach to interpreting the Act’s various exceptions.  
The Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting the congressional 
intent of these exceptions, which is based on giving effect to the 
plainest meaning of their language, lends invaluable insight into 
how the combatant activities exception should be applied.  Part II 
examines the combatant activities exception itself, introducing 
its component parts and discussing in greater detail the above-
referenced circuit split concerning its interpretation.  While there 
is a consensus as to the actors covered by the exception and the 
general circumstances under which it may apply, the circuits 
disagree on what types of activities are covered. 
Part III provides an overview of the problems inherent to 
each circuit’s understanding of what activities are covered by the 
exception.  Part IV, in light of these problems, proposes a solution 
which more adequately addresses the policy concerns attached to 
the exception.  These policy concerns, along with Supreme Court 
precedent and basic principles of equity, counsel strongly against 
the continued use of either approach.  The proposed approach 
discussed in this Part will take all of these considerations into 
account. 
The proposed solution is a two-part test.  It looks first, as the 
Supreme Court would, to the plain meaning of the exception’s 
language, and asks if the activity in question constitutes combat 
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as it is commonly understood.  An affirmative answer will give 
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the exception applies, 
thereby protecting the government’s interest.  However, the 
injured party will retain a chance to recover if he or she can 
present evidence that the complained-of activity violated the 
rules of engagement for the area in which it occurred.18  If the 
activity in question does not conform to common understandings 
of combat, a presumption will arise that the combatant activities 
exception does not apply, protecting injured parties’ interests in 
recovery.  However, this presumption, too, can be rebutted if the 
government can show that the activity is similar enough to 
combat that imposing liability for it would give rise to the same 
policy concerns as would imposing liability for combat.  To do 
this, the government would provide evidence based on the nature 
of the act in question and the physical and temporal proximity of 
the activity to actual combat. 
Lastly, Part V illustrates how this new standard would be 
applied to a variety of scenarios like those mentioned above, and 
in doing so will address the major criticisms that are likely to 
arise.  Starting with the facts of Aiello and moving into those 
surrounding Ms. Jones’s injuries, this Part will show how this 
new standard will provide more equitable results to activities 
that are clearly not combat, while preserving the government’s 
immunity in those cases where non-combat activities implicate 
the same policy concerns as actual combat.  Transitioning into 
injuries likely to result from the encroachment of warzones into 
densely populated urban areas, this Part will next discuss the 
benefits of this new approach to activities which are combat, but 
where non-combatants are injured. 
I. HISTORY OF THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION 
This Part examines the process behind determining what 
kind of liability the government did or did not assume with the 
FTCA.  In order to define “combatant activities” for the purposes 
of this exception, an examination of the history of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act and some of its exceptions is necessary.  To 
determine what kind of liability the government never intended 
to assume, and therefore, what type of activities should not give 
 
18 This Note does not, of course, suggest that enemy combatants should be able 
to seek relief in U.S. courts for injuries suffered as a result of U.S. military activity. 
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rise to liability under the FTCA, it is instructive to examine the 
process of determining what type of liability the government did 
intend to assume. 
A. History of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a qualified waiver of the 
sovereign immunity of the United States government with 
respect to civil actions.19  Enacted into law by Congress in 1948, 
the FTCA provides jurisdiction to the district courts over civil 
actions against the federal government, permitting claimants to 
seek judicial, rather than legislative, relief.20  Prior to the 
enactment of the FTCA, anyone seeking to press claims against 
the federal government for injuries to person or property was 
forced to introduce a private bill in Congress.21  These bills would 
go then to the Committee on Claims for consideration.22 
Not surprisingly, the Committee eventually became so 
inundated with bills that within a given session of Congress it 
was able to review only about half of the claims referred to it.23  
As a result, many injured parties were forced to wait years for 
the merits of their claims to be considered.24  After suffering this 
delay, claimants were next confronted by a “rule of unanimous 
consent,” by which a proposed bill of relief, having been given due 
consideration by a majority of the committee, could be defeated 
at the whim of one member, even if barely familiar with the 
claim.25  By 1931, however, Congress realized that this 
antiquated method of handling tort claims against the federal 
government was unjust and unsustainable,26 and it recognized 
the need for change.27  It was not until the FTCA was enacted, 
however, that a tenable and maintainable method of adjudicating 
claims against the federal government was established. 
 
19 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006). 
20 See id. § 1346(b). 
21 71 CONG. REC. 6868 (1931). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (noting that “[m]any times bad humor and prejudice on the part of some 
Member will defeat a worthy and just claim,” and that “with the vast number of bills 
referred to [the] committee it is impossible to keep up with [the] work”). 
27 See id. 
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The FTCA is an expression of the federal government’s 
willingness to accept liability for injuries caused by the 
negligence or wrongful acts of government employees acting 
within the scope of their duty.28  Taken together, the terms of the 
FTCA open the government to liability as if it were a private 
actor, and the remnants of sovereign immunity are preserved 
only in a handful of exceptions enumerated in § 2680 of the 
United States Code.29 
One of these exceptions, aptly dubbed the “combatant 
activities exception,” expressly exempts the government from 
liability for injuries “arising out of the combatant activities of the 
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 
war.”30  This ostensibly straightforward language belies the 
complexity of the considerations inherent to the exception’s 
creation.  A discussion of these considerations, an understanding 
of which is crucial to applying the exception appropriately, is 
informed by examining some of the Act’s other exceptions. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Other Exceptions to the 
FTCA 
To best infer which activities may properly be considered 
“combatant activities,” and therefore exempt from litigation 
under the FTCA, it is helpful to look at the process used to 
determine what kind of liability the government did or did not 
intend to assume.  This intention is revealed through other 
statutory exceptions to the FTCA.31  Each of these exceptions 
manifests an attempt to balance a government interest in 
efficient and effective operation within a given field against a 
private interest in recovery for injuries resulting from that 
operation.32  If the threat of liability would interfere too greatly 
with this government interest, then that field of operation would 
 
28 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 2013). 
29 See id. §§ 1346(b), 2680. 
30 Id. § 2680(j). 
31 See id. § 2680. 
32 See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 (1984) (stating that there are 
three objectives most commonly cited in legislative history as rationales for the 
exceptions to the FTCA: “ensuring that ‘certain governmental activities’ not be 
disrupted by the threat of damage suits; avoiding exposure of the United States to 
liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not extending the coverage of the Act 
to suits for which adequate remedies were already available”). 
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be exempted from suit by § 2680.33  While some of the exceptions 
under § 2680 preempt litigation of claims arising out of 
government operation within a discrete, clearly defined field, 
others, like the combatant activities exception, require some 
degree of interpretation.34 
1. Dolan v. United States Postal Service 
The Supreme Court has chosen to narrowly interpret 
exceptions to the FTCA, applying them in a manner that best 
conforms to a reasonable understanding of the language used.35  
In Dolan v. United States Postal Service,36 the Court held that a 
suit against the United States Postal Service for injuries 
resulting from negligently placed mail was not barred by 
§ 2680(b), an exception to the FTCA that covers the “negligent 
transmission of letters or postal matter.”37  The plaintiff in that 
case, Barbara Dolan, was injured after she tripped and fell over 
mail left on her porch by postal employees.38  Dolan brought suit 
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, claiming that the postal employees’ negligent 
placement of the mail had opened the government to liability 
under the FTCA.39  The district court dismissed the suit and the 
Third Circuit affirmed, with both courts concluding that although  
 
 
 
33 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680. 
34 Compare § 2680(d) (preempting “[a]ny claim for which a remedy is provided 
by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the 
United States”), § 2680(e) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising out of an act or omission 
of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1–31 
of Title 50, Appendix”), § 2680(k) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign 
country”), § 2680(l) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority”), and § 2680(m) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising from 
the activities of the Panama Canal Company”), with § 2680(b) (preempting “[a]ny 
claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or 
postal matter”), § 2680(i) (preempting “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal 
operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system”), and 
§ 2680(j) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the 
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war”). 
35 See Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854 (stating that “the fairest interpretation of the 
crucial portion of [§ 2680(c)] is the one that first springs to mind”). 
36 546 U.S. 481 (2006). 
37 Id. at 488–89; see § 2680(b). 
38 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 483. 
39 Id. 
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the FTCA waives sovereign immunity with respect to federal 
postal employees’ torts, the claim was barred by § 2680(b).40  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.41 
The Court declined to read breadth into the exception that 
was not expressed by the language Congress used.  It concluded 
that § 2680(b), which states that the government is not liable for 
“[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent 
transmission of letters or postal matter,”42 was never intended to 
apply to suits for injuries that were not “the sort primarily 
identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail 
throughout the United States.”43  The Court stated that “both 
context and precedent require a narrower reading [of § 2680(b)], 
so that ‘negligent transmission’ does not go beyond negligence 
causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or 
at the wrong address.”44  The Court felt that if Congress meant to 
preserve sovereign immunity for activities other than those most 
commonly associated with the Postal Service’s primary function 
of delivering mail, it would not have specified those activities as 
the only activities to which the exception extends.45 
The Court found additional significance in the statute’s 
wording beyond its specificity.  It was quick to note that “the 
words ‘negligent transmission’ in § 2680(b) follow two other 
terms, ‘loss’ and ‘miscarriage,’ ”46 and felt that the phrase 
“negligent transmission” should be interpreted in light of these 
accompanying terms.47  Because “both those terms refer to 
failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail,” the Court 
reasoned that “it would be odd if ‘negligent transmission’ swept  
 
 
 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 § 2680(b). 
43 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 489. 
44 Id. at 486. 
45 See id. at 489–90 (stating that “[o]ther FTCA exceptions paint with a far 
broader brush,” and that “[h]ad Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts 
related to postal delivery—torts including hazardous mail placement at customer 
homes—it could have used similarly sweeping language”); see also § 2680(b) 
(specifying “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” as the only sources of 
injuries against which the government retains immunity). 
46 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. 
47 Id. 
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far more broadly to include injuries . . . that happen to be caused 
by postal employees but involve neither failure to transmit mail 
nor damage to its contents.”48 
This was the “context” that the Court referred to as 
“requir[ing] a narrower reading [of § 2680(b)].”49  Briefly 
combining contextual and precedential analyses, the Court noted 
that the established “rule” that “[a] word is known by the 
company it keeps . . . is often wisely applied where a word is 
capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of 
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”50  This, however, 
was only a cursory glance at precedent by the Court.  The Court’s 
full analysis of precedent that “require[d] a narrower reading [of 
§ 2680(b)],” revolved around Kosak v. United States.51 
2. Kosak v. United States 
The Dolan Court’s deference to apparent legislative intent, 
reflected by its narrow interpretation of § 2680(b), was premised 
in large part on Kosak.52  In Kosak, the Court took a similar 
analytical approach to reach a different, but consistent, 
conclusion with respect to § 2680(c), finding that the absence of 
specific limiting language was a clear expression of congressional 
intent that the exception apply more broadly.53 
Kosak dealt with a claim against the government brought 
under the FTCA by a plaintiff whose property had been seized by 
the United States Customs Service.54  Alleging that some of the 
property eventually returned to him was damaged by the 
government while it was detained, plaintiff sought relief under 
the FTCA in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.55  The government moved for dismissal of the 
 
48 Id. at 487. 
49 See id. at 486–87; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
50 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 
307 (1961)). 
51 465 U.S. 848 (1984); see Dolan, 546 U.S. at 487 (stating “[o]ur interpretation 
would be less secure were it not for a precedent we deem to have decisive weight 
here. We refer to Kosak v. United States . . . .”). 
52 See id. at 487–88. 
53 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 855 (comparing the language of § 2680(b) and § 2680(c) 
and noting “[t]he absence of any analogous desire to limit the reach of the statutory 
exception pertaining to the detention of property by customs officials . . . in the 
phraseology of § 2680(c)”). 
54 Id. at 849–50. 
55 Id. at 850. 
FINAL_KUTNER 2/27/2014  6:30 PM 
2013] THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION 711 
complaint and for summary judgment, arguing that the claim 
was barred by § 2680(c).56  The district court granted the 
government’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.57  The 
court of appeals held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for 
which relief could be granted because “the ‘clear language’ of 
§ 2680(c) shields the United States from ‘all claims arising out of 
detention of goods by customs officers and does not purport to 
distinguish among types of harm.’ ”58  The Supreme Court 
affirmed, finding that the complaint was properly dismissed as 
barred by § 2680(c).59 
The Court interpreted § 2680(c) in the manner that it felt 
most closely reflected the plain meaning of its language.60  At the 
time Kosak was decided, § 2680(c), which has since been 
amended, exempted from suit under the FTCA “[a]ny claim 
arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or 
merchandise by any officer of customs.”61  The plaintiff argued 
that this language only covered claims for damage caused by the 
detention itself and not claims for damage inflicted while the 
property was in the possession of the Customs Service.62  The 
Court disagreed, finding that the phrase “ ‘any claim arising in 
respect of’ the detention of goods,” as used in the statute, meant 
“any claim ‘arising out of’ the detention of goods,” and included 
handling and storing detained property.63 
In reaching its decision, the Court juxtaposed the very 
general language of § 2680(c) with the specific language of 
§ 2680(b), the postal services exception.64  The Court recognized 
that the specificity in the postal services exception was not 
accidental; it was a product of the fact that one of the primary 
 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 850–51. 
58 Id. at 851 (quoting Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
59 Id. at 862. 
60 See id. (“The language of [§ 2680(c)] as it was written leaves us no choice but 
to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the [FTCA] does not cover suits 
alleging that customs officials injured property that had been detained by the 
Customs Service.”). 
61 Id. at 852 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The repeated use of the 
word “any” in this statute suggests a range of activities and persons covered, which 
stands in stark contrast to the specific and limited range of activity and persons 
covered by the combatant activities exception. See id. at 853, 855; see also infra note 
70 and accompanying text. 
62 Kosak, 465 U.S. at 852–53, 862. 
63 Id. at 854. 
64 Id. at 855. 
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goals of the FTCA was to waive the government’s immunity 
against liability for injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents in 
which postal employees were at fault.65  The Court reasoned that 
to ensure that § 2680(b) did not bar the exact type of suit that 
Congress was concerned about allowing, the exception’s drafters 
“carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the 
Government was not assuming financial responsibility—namely, 
‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or 
postal matter’—thereby excluding, by implication, negligent 
handling of motor vehicles.”66  Clearly, the Court felt that had 
Congress meant for § 2680(b) to preclude suits for motor vehicle 
accidents, the exception would have said so explicitly.  Similarly, 
had Congress meant to limit the application of § 2680(c) to 
damage to property caused by detention itself, it would have used 
limiting language instead of the broad sweeping terms it chose. 
II. THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION 
The combatant activities exception to the FTCA is designed 
to reflect the policy that the government should not be liable for 
injuries resulting from action taken by the armed forces in 
defense of the nation.67  Seemingly an extension of the doctrine of 
salus populi,68 the combatant activities exception is best 
understood as reflecting the principle that the interests of an 
injured few in recovering damages are outweighed by the 
interests of the United States in engaging enemies in combat 
unhindered by the threat of civil liability.69  The statute makes a 
very plain statement to this effect:  “The provisions of . . . [the 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992). 
68 Salus populi suprema lex esto is a legal maxim that means “let the welfare of 
the people be the supreme law.” Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/salus%20populi%20suprema 
%20lex%20esto (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). 
69 See, e.g., Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334–35 (“Congress certainly did not want our 
military personnel to exercise great caution at a time when bold and imaginative 
measures might be necessary to overcome enemy forces; nor did it want our 
soldiers . . . to be concerned about the possibility of tort liability when making life or 
death decisions in the midst of combat.”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (“The legislative history of the combatant activities exception is 
‘singularly barren,’ but it is plain enough that Congress sought to exempt combatant 
activities because such activities ‘by their very nature should be free from the 
hindrance of a possible damage suit.’ ” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 
767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948))). 
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FTCA] shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast 
Guard, during time of war.”70 
Viewed in light of this principle and the Supreme Court’s 
narrow interpretation of some of the FTCA’s other exceptions, 
the combatant activities exception can most sensibly be 
understood as preserving sovereign immunity against claims 
arising out of military combat.71  As discussed above, that this 
conclusion seems obvious serves only to reinforce that it is 
correct.72  An examination of the exception’s history, however, 
reveals that this understanding is far from universal. 
There appears to be a general consensus as to the actors 
covered by the exception and the context in which an act must 
occur to be covered; but there is significant disharmony regarding 
what types of activities constitute “combatant activities” and 
therefore fall under the exception.  Turning first to the agreed-
upon elements, it is widely accepted that in addition to uniform 
members of the United States armed forces, the combatant 
activities exception also shields private contractors from 
liability.73  Likewise, the exception is generally understood to 
apply to military activities even absent a formal declaration of 
war.74 
A. To Whom and When Does the Exception Apply? 
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have used the combatant 
activities exception to the FTCA to shield both uniform soldiers 
and private contractors from liability.75  Both courts share an 
understanding that the policies behind the combatant activities 
exception are the same whether the party responsible for an 
injury is a soldier or a private contractor.76  Accordingly, both 
 
70 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006). 
71 See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
72 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
73 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337. 
74 See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335. 
75 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (“During wartime, where a private service contractor 
is integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command 
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such activities 
shall be preempted.”); Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1336–37 (holding that plaintiffs’ action 
against the private manufacturers of an Aegis Air Defense System deployed by the 
United States Navy and used to shoot down a civilian airliner was preempted by the 
combatant activities exception). 
76 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337. 
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courts seem to agree that the imposition of liability on 
contractors for injuries caused in combat would interfere with the 
same interests that the imposition of liability on soldiers would.77  
Therefore, in situations where the combatant activities exception 
would bar claims against the government, it preempts claims 
against government contractors.78 
Similar policy-based reasoning serves as the foundation for 
the consensus among these courts that a formal declaration of 
war is not a prerequisite for applying the combatant activities 
exception.79  Just as those policy concerns are equally implicated 
whether the actor is a uniformed soldier or private contractor, 
they are also equally implicated “[w]hether that combat is 
formally authorized by the Congress or follows less formal 
actions of the Executive and Legislative branches.”80  Indeed, 
both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have applied the exception to 
shield the government and private contractors from liability for 
injuries arising out of combat in the absence of a congressional 
declaration of war.81 
B. “Combatant Activities” 
Whatever uniformity may result from this common 
understanding of the actors and circumstances covered by the 
exception is threatened by a potentially decisive split between 
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits as to what actual activity is covered.  
The two courts have taken very different approaches to 
interpreting the term “combatant activities.”  On the one hand, 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach can best be understood as 
precluding only claims for injuries arising out of what is most 
commonly understood as combat—“hostile encounters” with the 
enemy.82  It is therefore not only well in line with the Supreme 
Court’s approach to interpreting FTCA exceptions, but it also 
accounts for the exception’s foundational policy concern.83 
 
77 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337. 
78 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337. 
79 See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 1333. The Saleh court seemed to assume that a declaration of war 
was not necessary to apply the exception, as the subject was not discussed in the 
case. 
82 Id. at 1335. 
83 See supra notes 35, 69 and accompanying text. 
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On the other hand is the D.C. Circuit’s approach, which far 
more broadly interprets the exception as applying in such a way 
as to “eliminat[e] tort concepts from the battlefield.”84  While this 
approach does reflect the exception’s policy considerations, it 
seems to depart from Supreme Court precedent by reading 
unintended breadth into the statute.85  The difference between 
these two interpretations, which at first glance may seem merely 
semantic, is actually quite decisive.  An examination of the cases 
in which these respective approaches were promulgated and 
contrasted for subsequent application palpably highlights just 
how consequential the difference is. 
1. Koohi v. United States 
In Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
combatant activities exception barred claims against the 
government and private contractors brought by the families of 
passengers and crew members of an Iranian airliner shot down 
by a United States warship.86  The warship, the USS Vincennes, 
was a naval cruiser equipped with an Aegis Air Defense System 
manufactured by defendant contractors.87  As part of the 
American effort to protect ships carrying Iraqi cargo during the 
Iran-Iraq war, United States naval forces began engaging 
Iranian naval vessels in combat.88  In the midst of this ongoing 
conflict, the USS Vincennes dispatched a helicopter to investigate 
reports of activity by Iranian gunboats.89  When the helicopter 
reported that it had taken antiaircraft fire, the Vincennes crossed 
into Iranian waters and engaged the enemy gunboats.90  Minutes 
later, an Iranian civilian airliner departed from a “joint 
commercial-military airport” in Iran.91  “The Vincennes was in 
the vicinity of the aircraft’s flight path” and mistook it for an  
 
 
84 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
85 See supra Part I.B. 
86 Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1330, 1333. 
87 Id. at 1330. 
88 Id. (citing multiple “publicized incidents” in which Iranian and United States 
naval forces clashed, resulting in casualties and extensive damage to property on 
both sides). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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Iranian military jet.92  Using the Aegis Air Defense System, the 
crew of the Vincennes targeted the airliner and shot it down over 
the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 people aboard.93 
Plaintiffs brought suit against the United States government 
and the various manufacturers of the Aegis Air Defense System, 
alleging that negligent operation of the Vincennes and design 
defects in the air defense system led to misidentification of the 
airliner and the decision to fire on it.94  While the court 
recognized that the incident was tragic, it nevertheless held that 
the action was barred by the combatant activities exception.95 
The action taken by the Vincennes was found to constitute 
combatant activity because it involved the direction of hostile 
action towards what was perceived as an enemy.96  Although the 
court did not go so far as to define combatant activity as 
necessarily involving hostile action or conduct directly connected 
to it, its repeated association of the combatant activities 
exception with acts of hostility leads to this conclusion.97  This 
conclusion is also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
understanding that the policy behind the combatant activities 
exception “is to ensure that the government will not be liable for 
negligent conduct by our armed forces in times of combat.”98 
Understanding the exception to be limited to hostile 
engagements or conduct directly connected to them is fairly well 
in keeping with Supreme Court precedent.  As discussed above, 
the Supreme Court narrowly interprets exceptions to the FTCA, 
using the most reasonable understanding of the exception’s 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1330–31. 
95 Id. at 1335–36. 
96 Id. at 1337. 
97 Id. at 1335 (noting that “tort law, in toto, is an inappropriate subject for 
injection into the area of military engagements. The FTCA clearly recognizes this 
principle . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (stating the FTCA applies “when . . . United 
States armed forces engage in an organized series of hostile encounters on a 
significant scale” (emphasis added)); id. at 1335–36 (noting that for purposes of the 
exemption from the FTCA, “it is of no significance whether a plane that is shot down 
is civilian or military, so long as the person giving the order or firing the weapon 
does so for the purpose of furthering our military objectives or of defending lives, 
property, or other interests” (emphasis added)); id. at 1337 (stating that “one 
purpose of the combatant activities exception is to recognize that during wartime 
encounters no duty of reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed 
as a result of authorized military action” (emphasis added)). 
98 Id. at 1334. 
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language.99  Interpreting the combatant activities exception using 
the same methods employed by the Supreme Court, it seems 
likely that Congress meant to exempt from the FTCA only 
military activity involving or necessary to hostile action. 
Had Congress intended to exempt a broader range of 
activity, as some courts argue, it could simply have left out the 
descriptive word “combatant” in the exception.100  If, as the 
Supreme Court suggested in Kosak v. United States, “the fairest 
interpretation of the crucial portion of [an exception to the FTCA] 
is the one that first springs to mind,” then “combatant activities” 
should be interpreted as requiring hostile action.101  However, the 
D.C. Circuit opened the door for a much broader interpretation. 
2. Saleh v. Titan Corp. 
In Saleh v. Titan Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that the 
combatant activities exception preempted claims brought by 
Iraqi nationals against private military contractors used by the 
United States government for interrogation and interpretation 
services.102  The plaintiffs claim that they were subjected to abuse 
by the defendants while held at the Abu Ghraib military prison 
in Iraq.103  The court, relying on its understanding that “all of the 
traditional rationales for tort law—deterrence of risk-taking 
behavior, compensation of victims, and punishment of 
tortfeasors—are singularly out of place in combat situations, 
where risk-taking is the rule,”104 concluded that “the policy 
embodied by the combatant activities exception is simply the 
elimination of tort from the battlefield.”105 
 
99 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
100 See generally Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 
698 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Congress could certainly have drafted or modified the exception 
to say, “The provisions of . . . [the FTCA] shall not apply to any claims arising out of 
the activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during a time of 
war.” 
101 Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). The first interpretation of 
“combatant activities” that comes to mind, especially when viewed in light of the 
accompanying terms, is a hostile military engagement. It is not a great stretch to say 
that the interpretation of “combatant activities” that “first springs to mind” would 
include the tracking, targeting, and engaging of what was legitimately perceived as 
a hostile aircraft. 
102 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
103 Id. at 2. 
104 Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted) (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 
1334–35 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
105 Id. 
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Because the imposition of tort liability would necessarily 
conflict with “the FTCA’s policy of eliminating tort concepts from 
the battlefield,” the court determined that this case presented it 
with a form of general conflict preemption.106  Coining the term 
“battle-field preemption,” the court announced that “the federal 
government occupies the field when it comes to warfare, and its 
interest in combat is always ‘precisely contrary’ to the imposition 
of a non-federal tort duty.”107  It would not be long before this 
broad-sweeping concept was taken to its logical conclusion. 
3. Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. 
In Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held 
that the combatant activities exception preempted claims 
brought by a civilian contractor who was injured when he fell in a 
bathroom within Camp Shield, a forward operating base in 
Iraq.108  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a private service 
contractor retained by the government to provide support 
services at Camp Shield, was negligent in its construction and 
maintenance of the latrine facility.109  The Southern District 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
that the maintenance of the latrine facility fell into the category 
of “combatant activity.”110  Applying the doctrine promulgated by 
the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corp., this decision highlights 
the dramatic difference between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ 
interpretations of combatant activities.111 
The court found that the Ninth Circuit’s approach of 
“remov[ing] the duty of care only as to ‘those against whom force 
is directed’ [was] unduly narrow.”112  It reasoned that the Koohi 
standard, “which limits the [government] interest to precluding 
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 
500 (1988)). 
108 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 715. 
111 Id. at 709–10. Beyond the outcome of the case, which itself exemplifies the 
substantial differences between the two approaches, the court remarked that “the 
differences between these formulations are significant,” and that if the Koohi 
standard were applied, there would be no conflict in this case and therefore no 
preemption. See id. at 709. 
112 Id. at 709 (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 
1992)). 
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suits brought by those against whom force is directed,” would not 
serve the policies underlying the exception.113  The court instead 
adopted the D.C. Circuit’s formulation and stated that “the 
combatant activity exception creates a type of field 
preemption[;] . . . [i]t is not necessary to determine whether 
military judgments would necessarily be examined . . . because 
any claim arising out of combatant activities is preempted.”114  In 
keeping with this understanding that there is no room on the 
battlefield for tort liability, regardless of whether military 
judgment is implicated in a decision which caused injury, the 
court determined that for the purposes of this exception, the 
maintenance of a bathroom was a combatant activity.115  This 
conclusion seems to clash with both Supreme Court precedent 
and the purpose of the combatant activities exception. 
It is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court, in light of 
its narrow treatment of other exceptions to the FTCA, would 
apply the combatant activities exception to the maintenance of a 
bathroom absent some extenuating circumstances.  It is true, as 
the Aiello court noted, “that the creation and maintenance of 
these necessary facilities is integral to sustaining combat 
operations.”116  But is latrine maintenance any more integral to 
sustaining combat operations than is the use of motor vehicles by 
the Postal Service to the delivery of mail?  The Supreme Court 
has clearly stated that negligent operation of postal vehicles, 
though necessary for the postal service to perform its primary 
function, is not exempt from suit under the “Postal Service 
Exception.”117  That an activity is necessary to combat, it would 
appear, should not be enough to bring that activity under the 
ambit of the combatant activities exception. 
Even assuming that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
combatant activities exception is too narrow, and that the 
direction of hostility is not a prerequisite for its application, it 
can hardly be said that the most reasonable interpretation of the 
exception’s plain language would necessarily extend immunity to 
 
113 Id. at 710. 
114 Id. at 710–11. 
115 Id. at 713. 
116 Id. at 714. 
117 Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855 (1984). On the contrary, the Kosak 
Court noted that “[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was 
to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto 
accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault.” Id. 
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latrine maintenance simply because of location.  Applying the 
same methods that the Supreme Court has, it becomes clear that 
this area is simply too far removed from the most likely intent of 
Congress in drafting the combatant activities exception. 
III. A NEW STANDARD IS NEEDED 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “combatant activities” 
is closer to the plain text of the statute than the D.C. Circuit’s.  
Instead of including any activity that occurs on a battlefield, it 
only includes the direction of hostile force or other activity that is 
immediately connected thereto, such as the tracking and 
targeting of the enemy aircraft in Koohi.118  It is sensible to say 
that it becomes less likely that the government intended to 
assume liability for an activity the closer that activity is to 
engaging an enemy. 
When Koohi was decided, however, the nature of wars being 
fought by the United States was very different than it is today.119  
As enemies become increasingly difficult to discern from 
civilians, and warzones become increasingly urbanized, it 
becomes more likely that the U.S. military will injure 
noncombatants while directing force at the enemy.120  Therefore, 
the “blanket” protection of hostile action afforded by the Koohi 
standard may be inappropriate. 
At the same time, the same policy concerns underlying the 
exception still favor ensuring that military decision-makers, at 
whatever level, are not so concerned with incurring liability that 
they refrain from acting in defense of the nation.  While the D.C. 
Circuit’s standard clearly accounts for these concerns, its 
continued application will lead to more inequitable results like 
that seen in Aiello.  Simply precluding any action for injuries 
that occurred on a battlefield, regardless of their cause, gives the 
government too much immunity at the expense of injured parties.  
A better balance must be struck between the conflicting interests 
of the government in defending the nation free from the threat of 
 
118 See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333–36 (9th Cir. 1992). 
119 The conflict surrounding Koohi involved the United States conducting naval 
combat operations against Iranian military forces in a clearly-defined, recognizable, 
and relatively uninhabited combat zone. See id. at 1329–30, 1337. The current war 
in Iraq, on the other hand, involves combat operations in populated cities against 
ununiformed insurgents. See Tavernise & Lehern, supra note 12. 
120 See Tavernise & Lehern, supra note 12. 
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liability, and those of parties injured as a result of activity that 
cannot rightly be considered combat, but nevertheless may 
currently be precluded from suit by the combatant activities 
exception. 
IV. A NEW STANDARD 
This Note proposes that a possible solution to this dilemma 
lies in a two-step process that will account for the government’s 
interest in preserving its immunity for activities necessary to 
national defense as well as the interests of injured parties.  The 
first step is to ask whether or not the activity that gave rise to 
the injury was clearly combatant, as the word is most commonly 
understood.  In other words, the question becomes:  “Did the 
injury arise from the direction of hostile force?”  Step two 
depends on the answer to that question.  If the answer is no, a 
rebuttable presumption arises that the combatant activities 
exception does not apply.121  If the answer is yes, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that it does. 
A. Step One—Is the Activity Clearly “Combatant?” 
Step one begins essentially with an application of the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard:  The court must determine if the activity that 
gave rise to the injury is one that would be considered combat as 
it is commonly understood.122  This reflects both the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of other exceptions to the FTCA and the 
policy concerns behind the combatant activities exception. 
If the activity was clearly not combative, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that the combatant activities exception does 
not apply.  To overcome this, the government will have to show 
that the activity, although it was not the direction of force or 
connected immediately to the direction of force, was so like 
combat that it implicates the same policy concerns that serve as 
the foundation for the combatant activities exception.  In other 
words, the government will have to show that the threat of 
imposing tort liability for this activity would cause hesitation to 
 
121 It should be noted that the inapplicability of the combatant activities 
exception does not necessarily mean that the government will be liable for the 
injury. There are other exceptions to the FTCA, such as the discretionary function 
exception and foreign country exception, which may still bar the suit. See 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (k) (2006). 
122 See supra Part II.B.1. 
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act that would be detrimental to national defense.  This showing 
should be based on three criteria: the nature of the act 
performed, the physical proximity of the act to combat, and the 
temporal proximity of the act to combat. 
The nature of the activity and its physical and temporal 
proximity to combat are logical considerations when determining 
whether an act, though not actually combat, is similar enough to 
combat that it raises the same policy concerns.  An examination 
of the nature of the activity should focus on how necessary it is to 
combat.  The more necessary an activity is to combat, the higher 
the risk becomes that imposing liability on it would harm 
national security interests.  Similarly, the closer an activity 
occurs to combat, in terms of both physical space and time, the 
more likely it becomes that it would implicate the same concerns 
as combat.  The physical proximity consideration should 
therefore be based, quite simply, on how near or far from a 
combat zone the activity occurred.  As for the temporal proximity 
consideration, any bright line rule based on the time elapsed 
since the last shot was fired would obviously be inappropriate.  
Therefore, this consideration should be based on whether the 
activity was performed so long after hostilities had ceased that, 
depending on the activity, neither additional deliberation nor 
earlier action would reasonably have threatened military 
interests.  Taken together, these three considerations provide a 
lens through which to view the overlap, if any, of the policy 
concerns behind the combatant activities exception and those 
raised by a given non-combat military activity. 
B. Step 2—Applying the Rules of Engagement 
If the activity in question is clearly combat, a rebuttable 
presumption arises in favor of the government that the 
combatant activities exception applies.  To overcome this 
presumption, the plaintiff will have to show that the activity 
which gave rise to the injury violated the rules of engagement for 
the field in which the injury occurred.  The rules of engagement 
are statements issued by the United States military that govern 
when force can be used by military personnel outside of the 
United States.123  They are designed to “provide guidance from 
 
123 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD 
COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT A-17, GL-5 (2007). 
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the President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as well as 
subordinate commanders, to deployed units on the use of force.”124  
They are mission-specific and are intended to be promulgated to 
each individual soldier and commander.125 
Because soldiers should always be operating within the rules 
of engagement, imposing tort liability for a clear violation of 
them will not cause the chilling effect on life-or-death decision-
making that the courts have feared.126  Deployed units will not 
have to take any precautions to avoid tort liability beyond those 
they must already take upon entering a combat zone.  If the 
injury arose as a result of the direction of force that was 
sanctioned by the rules of engagement, which any force used 
should have, the combatant activities exception will apply. 
V. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION OF THE TWO-PART TEST TO 
VARIOUS FACT PATTERNS 
Applying this two-part test to sample fact patterns reveals 
that it prevents some injured parties’ claims from being denied 
by a tool never intended to be put to that use, while at the same 
time protects the government’s interest in engaging hostile forces 
free from the threat of liability.  Critics of this approach will 
likely argue foremost that opening the government to liability for 
combat-related injuries at all will compromise the military’s 
ability to perform its most essential function.  However, under 
this test the government is only liable for combat-related injuries 
when that combat violates the rules of engagement, which gives 
the military a considerably wide berth in waging war.  Further, it 
is not at all anomalous to Supreme Court jurisprudence that the 
government may be held liable when its agents depart from a 
governmentally prescribed course of action.127 
 
124 See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S 
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 73 (2010) [hereinafter 
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
125 Id. at 80–81. 
126 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
127 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“Thus, the 
discretionary function exception [to the FTCA] will not apply when a federal statute, 
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 
follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the 
directive.”). 
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A. Application to Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. 
Applying this new standard to the Aiello case illustrates its 
advantages over either of the inflexible existing standards 
discussed in this Note.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach would 
immediately preclude the application of the exception in a case 
like Aiello because the complained-of activity, negligent 
maintenance of a bathroom, did not involve the direction of 
hostile force.128  On the other hand, under the D.C. Circuit’s 
approach the exception would immediately be applied because 
the activity occurred on what was considered a battlefield.  The 
approach proposed by this Note considers additional factors that 
allow it to account for the unique circumstances of a given case 
that can inform a decision to assign liability. 
Even in a case like Aiello, which did not involve combat, an 
argument can be made that the combatant activities exception 
should apply.  Because such a case clearly does not arise out of 
combat as it is commonly understood, under the proposed 
approach, a presumption arises that the combatant activities 
exception does not apply.  To maintain immunity under this 
exception, the government must show that the activity in 
question implicates the same policy concerns as combat itself.  
This showing should be based on the nature of the act and its 
physical and temporal proximity to combat. 
Turning first to the nature of the activity in Aiello, it must be 
noted that bathroom maintenance is essential to combat 
activity.129  That activity may then be an appropriate basis for 
applying the exception if the government can show that, based on 
its physical and temporal proximity to combat, imposing liability 
would run contrary to national security interests.  As for the 
physical proximity of the bathroom to combat, it was located on a 
forward operating base about three miles outside of the “Green 
Zone” in Baghdad, Iraq.130  This base served as “ ‘a refit, re-
arming point, and a living area’ for U.S. and coalition military 
forces.”131  Significantly, the base had come under attack by 
hostile forces “[a]round Easter 2008,”132 so an argument could be 
 
128 See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
129 Id. at 713–14. 
130 Id. at 701. 
131 Id. (citation omitted).  
132 Id. 
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made that the base itself was a combat zone, or at least 
physically close enough to one, so that imposing tort liability for 
government action there could implicate some of the policy 
concerns embodied in the combatant activities exception.  Even 
giving the government contractor the benefit of this doubt, 
however, the combatant activities exception should not be used to 
bar this action. 
Application of the combatant activities exception in this case 
would be foreclosed under this proposed approach because of the 
temporal disconnection of the involved negligence to combat.  The 
amount of time that elapsed between the last hostilities at the 
base and the plaintiff’s injuries was simply too great to say that 
earlier action would have imperiled military interests.  The facts 
of the case suggest that the last hostile action to cause any sort of 
danger on the base occurred towards the end of March 2008.133 
The plaintiff was injured “on or about May 18, 2008” when 
he fell in a bathroom on the base.134  For over a month the 
defendant contractor had the opportunity to repair what were 
allegedly obvious, dangerous defects in the bathroom.135  
Certainly, failing to repair these defects within the hours, or even 
days, immediately following an attack could be excused because 
of the elevated risk to maintenance personnel.  However, as the 
amount of time since the last hostile exchange increased, the risk 
to such personnel must have started to be outweighed by the 
interests in the efficient operation of the base.  Surely the base 
was not so paralyzed for an entire month by the threat of another 
attack that all basic support functions ceased. 
Contractors who knowingly enter combat zones should not be 
excused by the combatant activities exception for failing to act to 
remedy obvious dangers to military personnel when presented 
with such a long period of relatively low risk.  Even if an activity 
is essential to combat and takes place in a combat zone, it cannot 
be said that it raises the same policy concerns as actual combat if 
the actor is not under the same kind of duress as actual 
combatants.  A month-long, unexcused disregard of unsafe 
 
133 See id. (stating that “[a]round Easter 2008, [the base] was subject to three 
incidents of mortar and rocket attacks,” and not indicating other attacks on the 
base); see also Easter 2008 Is the Earliest in Nearly a Century, TIMEANDDATE.COM 
(Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.timeanddate.com/news/holidays/early-easter-2008.html 
(stating that in 2008, Easter fell on March 23). 
134 Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 701. 
135 See id. 
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conditions in a restroom simply does not involve the kind of life-
or-death, instantaneous decision-making that the combatant 
activities exception was designed to protect. 
As highlighted by its application to the facts of the Aiello 
case, the advantage of this proposed approach over the Ninth and 
D.C. Circuits’ current approaches lies in its flexibility.  This 
approach considers factors beyond the location of the activity or 
whether it involved the direction of force.  Therefore, it would 
enable the combatant activities exception to be applied in a 
manner more in line with both Supreme Court precedent and 
fundamental concepts of fairness without exposing the 
government to undue liability.  This advantage is further 
underscored by an application of the approach to Jamie Leigh 
Jones’s case. 
B. Application to Jamie Leigh Jones’s Injuries 
Jamie Leigh Jones was a clerical worker for a company 
called Overseas Administrative Services, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Halliburton/KBR.136  Her employment placed her in 
the United States Army’s Central Command Area of Operations, 
which was located in an area of Baghdad known as the “Green 
Zone.”137  Almost immediately upon arriving in Iraq, Ms. Jones 
was subjected to sexual harassment.138  Making matters worse, 
she was not provided with the private, female-only housing she 
claims she was promised in her contract; instead, she was housed 
in a barracks shared with other, mostly male, employees.139  Her 
complaints of sexual harassment were crassly ignored by 
Halliburton/KBR management.140  On the evening of her third 
day in Iraq, Ms. Jones “was drugged, beaten, and gang-raped by 
several Halliburton/KBR employees in her barracks bedroom.”141  
Although Ms. Jones’s eventual case was not decided based on 
application of the combatant activities exception, after Aiello it 
seems possible that a similar case might barred if brought today 
in a jurisdiction applying the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation.142 
 
136 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 2009). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 It should be noted that even the Aiello court discussed the importance of the 
fact that the activity at issue in that case was necessary to combat. See Aiello v. 
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Given the obvious lack of combat in this scenario, it is clear 
that under the Ninth Circuit’s standard the combatant activities 
exception would not bar Ms. Jones’s claims; however given the 
location of Ms. Jones’s attack, one wonders whether the D.C. 
Circuit’s standard might.  Although the “Green Zone” is not itself 
a combat zone,143 is it far enough removed from combat 
operations that the D.C. Circuit’s approach would not bar Ms. 
Jones’s claim?  What if a similar incident happened outside of the 
“Green Zone,” in an area like the forward operating base in 
Aiello?  It is highly doubtful that the drafters of the combatant 
activities exception ever meant for it to apply in such scenario, 
but that outcome is not entirely unlikely given the D.C. Circuit’s 
understanding that the policy behind the exception is to 
“eliminat[e] . . . tort from the battlefield.”144  The solution 
proposed in this Note would help to ensure that the combatant 
activities exception is not applied to claims brought by 
individuals situated similarly to Ms. Jones. 
Because Ms. Jones’s claims against the government arose 
out of activity that was clearly not combat, under the proposed 
solution a presumption would arise that the exception does not 
apply.  To rebut this presumption, the government would have to 
show that the activity in question raised the same policy 
concerns as combat.  Using the three proposed criteria, the 
government contractor would understandably be unable to make 
this showing with respect to the sexual assault committed by its 
employees. 
Looking first at the nature of the activity in question, it goes 
without saying that sexual assault on an administrative 
contractor employee is not essential to combat.  This criterion 
therefore presents a high hurdle for the government contractor to 
overcome.  It would be very difficult for the contractor to show 
that such an activity, nonessential to combat, raises the same 
policy concerns that combat does.  Even if a sexual assault were 
 
Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
However, if courts were to strictly apply the exception in such a way as to 
“eliminat[e] . . . tort from the battlefield,” as the D.C. Circuit has suggested, claims 
for sexual assault may be barred. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
143 See Liz Sly, Goodbye to Baghdad’s Inner Sanctum; U.S. Hands Control of the 
Green Zone to Iraq. Inside Is a Haven; Outside, Resentment, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 
2010, at A3. 
144 See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7. 
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to somehow occur in a combat zone during a hostile exchange, it 
is so unrelated to combat that there is no way it could rationally 
be considered as implicating the same policy concerns that 
combat raises.  There would be no harm to national security 
interests in imposing liability on contractors for sexual assaults 
carried out by their employees.  The combatant activities 
exception would therefore necessarily bar these kinds of claims 
under this proposed solution.  On the other end of the spectrum 
of this proposed approach are activities that the exception would 
almost certainly bar, just as either of the existing approaches 
would. 
C. Application to Non-Combatants in Combat Zones 
A discussion of this proposed solution would be incomplete 
without an application to a scenario involving non-combatants 
injured by the direction of hostile force.  Such a scenario will 
likely give rise to the sternest criticism of the approach.  Critics 
would rightly be concerned about the policy implications of any 
approach that potentially opens the government to more liability 
than existing standards for conduct involving the use of force.  As 
this section shows, however, these concerns are largely 
unfounded. 
This approach recognizes the pressing government interest 
in allowing U.S. military forces to wage war free from irrational 
constraint, while waiving immunity only for violations of those 
constraints already imposed by the government itself.  Using this 
approach, immunity for actions taken in combat would be 
retained unless the action was a clear violation of the rules of 
engagement in that particular combat zone.  This has the effect 
of allowing non-combatants to recover for injuries suffered as a 
result of blatant misconduct by U.S. forces without placing any 
additional restraint on permissible military conduct.  Soldiers in 
combat would not be required to act any differently in order for 
the exception to continue to apply. 
Under this approach, if the activity in question is clearly 
combat as it is commonly understood, the plaintiff will have to 
show that the combat violated the rules of engagement in order 
to proceed in court.  This is not easily done because the rules of 
engagement afford U.S. forces considerable discretion in acting to 
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accomplish their missions and in defending themselves.145  Rules 
of engagement permit the use of force proportional to a perceived 
threat, while proscribing conduct that unnecessarily endangers 
civilians.146  They appear to be aimed at allowing U.S. forces to 
accomplish their missions as safely as possible for both 
themselves and the surrounding civilian population.147  
Therefore, they are very fitting guidelines for this proposed 
approach, which strives to achieve an appropriate balance 
between the government interest in waging war free from the 
threat of liability and the recovery interests of unjustifiably 
injured noncombatants. 
As an example of how this proposed approach will use the 
rules of engagement to strike that balance, consider an Iraqi 
civilian injured as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2005.  If 
the injury resulted from the direction of hostile force, that 
civilian would have to rebut the presumption that the combatant 
activities exception applies by showing that the force used 
violated the rules of engagement for that operation.  If it did, 
then the case should proceed because that would mean that the 
U.S. military used unauthorized and unnecessary force. 
The rules of engagement governing the use of force during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly stated that soldiers had “the 
right to use necessary and proportional force” to defend 
themselves, but also that “[m]ilitary operations will, in so far as 
possible, minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral 
damage.”148  The rules also required that U.S. forces establish 
with “a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a 
legitimate military target” prior to engagement.149  Therefore, 
under this proposed approach, a civilian injured by U.S. forces 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom would be able circumvent the 
combatant activities exception only if the injury resulted from 
the use of clearly disproportional and essentially indiscriminate 
force. 
Among the more glaring examples of conduct violating the 
rules of engagement from the Iraq war was the killing of two 
dozen unarmed civilians in the town of Haditha by U.S. Marines 
 
145 See generally OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 73–102. 
146 See id. at 97–102. 
147 See id. 
148 Id. at 102. 
149 Id. 
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in 2005.150  After a roadside bomb killed one Marine and wounded 
two others, Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich “[led] his troops to 
disregard rules of combat” and “storm[] two nearby homes, 
blasting their way in with gunfire and grenades.”151  The raid 
resulted in the deaths of unarmed women and children, as well 
as a man in a wheelchair.152  At a plea hearing as part of his 
subsequent court martial, Wuterich admitted that prior to the 
raid he told the squad to “shoot without hesitation, leading them 
to believe they could ignore the rules of combat.”153  Wuterich 
further admitted that, despite his training, he did not positively 
identify his targets, and that at no time during the raid on the 
homes did his squad take any gunfire or find any weapons.154  As 
a result of this lethal and unsanctioned raid, Wutherich was 
charged with manslaughter.155 
This massacre exemplifies just the sort of indiscriminate and 
clearly excessive force that the rules of engagement proscribe.156  
It also therefore exemplifies the precise type of misconduct that, 
under this proposed solution, would enable a plaintiff to 
overcome the combatant activities exception.  If the action in 
question is so blatantly inappropriate as to—even in combat—
give rise to criminal charges, should it not then also be 
sufficiently inappropriate to give rise to liability? 
That soldiers would face criminal charges for this level of 
misconduct serves not only to validate holding it as a basis for 
liability, but also to abrogate perhaps the strongest criticism of 
doing so: the potential chilling effect on soldiers.  After all, it 
could hardly be said that the prospect of tort liability is more 
likely to lead soldiers to take undue precaution in assuring they 
operate within the rules of engagement than is the existing 
threat of criminal sanctions for failing to do so. 
Imposing liability on the government for the use of 
disproportional and indiscriminate force that violates the rules of 
engagement is not unduly burdensome.  In fact, the government 
 
150 See Julie Watson, Marine Accepts Plea Deal in Iraqi Civilian Deaths, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/marine-accepts-plea-deal-
iraqi-civilian-deaths-193047300.html. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. 
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has itself recognized as a legal principle, at least with respect to 
the use of nuclear weapons, that a “distinction must be made at 
all times between persons taking part in hostilities and members 
of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as 
much as possible.”157  If this legal principle applies to the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, surely it should apply to the use of 
far more precise and discerning force as well.  Furthermore, 
based on Supreme Court precedent, violations of the rules of 
engagement may be a basis for liability because the rules are 
essentially sets of government regulations meant to prescribe 
courses of action for soldiers to follow.158 
CONCLUSION 
The approach proposed in this Note provides a flexible 
standard by which courts can determine whether or not the 
combatant activities exception should be applied to shield the 
government from liability for actions taken by the nation’s 
military forces.  It allows unjustifiably injured parties an 
opportunity to recover, while imposing no additional constraints 
on soldiers.159  Therefore, it solves the dilemma of how to 
compensate noncombatants injured by military action without 
risking U.S. military interests.  Soldiers can continue to fight and 
function just as they always have.  Only those injuries that could 
clearly have been avoided without compromising national 
security, and are therefore unjustifiable, will give rise to 
liability.160 
Based on Supreme Court precedent, this approach channels 
the likely intent of Congress in drafting the combatant activities 
exception and applies it in light of contemporary realities.  It 
protects the government from assuming liability that it never 
intended to assume, while allowing recovery by those injured on 
the rare occasions when the government goes beyond its self-
imposed limitations on actions taken in national defense. 
 
 
157 Burrus M. Carnahan, Nuclear Weapons, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE 
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 260, 260 (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 1999). 
158 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra Part V. 
160 See supra Part V. 
